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This Article highlights and expands on an argument that I made in 
late 2007 advocating for a reexamination of Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 (the Fair Housing Act)1 in the unique and 
important context of the reconstruction and revitalization of New 
Orleans.2  As a threshold matter, it is imperative to recognize that 
litigation cannot stand alone from coalitions and community activism, 
all of which give communities a voice, provide them with leverage, 
and help to rebalance power.  As Beverly Wright points out, 
communities can mobilize to address environmental injustices 
through collaborative problem solving between community members, 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.  I 
would like to thank Michael Daniel of Daniel & Beshara, P.C., in Dallas, Texas, for 
discussing earlier versions of this Article and the Cox and Lopez decisions with me and for 
his valuable contribution about the Fair Housing Act’s potential application under Lopez, 
which is discussed in the text below.  I would also like to thank William Kern for 
explaining to me his research concerning arsenic testing in soil, based on his presentation 
at a joint workshop at the Race, Place, and the Environment After Katrina symposium on 
May 15, 2008, held by the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice (DSCEJ).  I wish 
to thank E. Gail Suchman for her wonderful insight, comments, and encouragement when 
I began exploring the Fair Housing Act’s role after Hurricane Katrina.  This Article builds 
on that work and my presentation at the DSCEJ symposium, and it would not have come 
about but for the ongoing commitment to a just idea of home and community by Drs. 
Robert Bullard and Beverly Wright and the DSCEJ.  Finally, I am grateful for the skillful 
edtorial review and suggestions of the editors and staff of the Journal of Environmental 
Law and Litigation.  For Suki. 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006). 
2 Benjamin Rajotte, Environmental Justice in New Orleans: A New Lease on Life for 
Title VIII?, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 51 (2007). 
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educators, and researchers in a relationship founded on equal 
partnership.3 
Reilly Morse captures the role of litigation, together with these 
additional community-based forces, in Environmental Justice 
Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina: 
 Minority and disempowered populations are at great 
disadvantage in securing equitable policy decisions from elected 
and appointed official bodies through conventional processes 
because political power tends to be asymmetrical.  When the 
controversy can be brought into federal court, however, and the 
disparate impact of the proposed action is scrutinized, the power 
relationship shifts . . . .4 
Consider this alongside Robert Bullard’s observation that “[t]he 
push for environmental equity is an extension of the civil rights 
movement.”5  Here, the Fair Housing Act codifies civil rights as they 
relate to fair housing, and it is loosely considered alongside Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 and the Equal Protection Clause7 as a 
federal regime designed to achieve civil rights and social justice.  All 
of this poses the instant question: whether a civil rights regime that 
deals with housing can advance environmental justice in terms of new 
housing opportunities post-Katrina. 
It is important to observe that this Article focuses on New Orleans 
merely to allow for a more discrete analysis, both legally and 
factually.  I believe that the theories it espouses are generally 
applicable; they turn on the facts, not geography.  The recent flooding 
in Texas, coupled with growing exposure and vulnerability of many 
coastal habitats to such ecological disasters, reinforces this idea. 
 
3 Beverly Wright, Environmental Equity Justice Centers: A Response to Inequity, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLITICS, AND SOLUTIONS 57, 63–65 (Bunyan Bryant 
ed., 1995); see also Gary Williams, Drum Majors for Justice–Leading the March Toward 
Social Justice, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 925, 933 (2004) (“[W]e need academicians and 
advocates who see how the threads . . . interlink in the quilt of social justice.”). 
4 REILLY MORSE, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE EYE OF HURRICANE 
KATRINA 25 (2008), available at http://jointcenter.org/publications_recent_publications/ 
environmental_projects/environmental_justice_through_the_eye_of_hurricane_katrina 
(follow “Download the file” hyperlink). 
5 ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 13 (3d ed. 2000). 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006). 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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I 
FAIR HOUSING ACT THEORIES AND HURRICANE KATRINA 
Section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to 
“discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of 
services or facilities in connection therewith.”8  As held by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Cox v. City of Dallas, the 
discriminatory conduct must take place “in connection” with the “sale 
or rental” of housing.9  In Cox, the plaintiffs sued the city for failing 
to prevent illegal dumping at a landfill near their homes in the 
Deepwood neighborhood of Dallas.10  The Fifth Circuit held that “the 
‘services’ subject to the alleged discrimination must be ‘in 
connection’ with the ‘sale or rental’” of housing.11  The section 
3604(b) claim failed because the city’s conduct was not connected to 
the sale or rental of the plaintiffs’ homes.12  The court found this 
interpretation to be “grammatically superior.”13  Though 
acknowledging that Title VIII was “meant to have a broad reach,” the 
court expressed concern over claims resting on harm to property 
values and Title VIII acting in a “general anti-discrimination pose.”14 
As this shows, Cox involved post-acquisition claims by individuals 
asserting interests shared by their community as a result of certain 
acts of municipal discrimination.  In Halprin v. Prairie Single Family 
Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, decided a year earlier, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that a 
homeowners association and its members were part of a menacing 
campaign of harassment against them because of their religion.15  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the homeowners association and members 
 
8 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
9 Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005).  The Fifth Circuit has 
jurisdiction over appeals from the federal district courts sitting in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Texas. 
10 Id. at 739–40. 
11 Id. at 746. 
12 Id. at 746–47. 
13 Id. at 745. 
14 Id. at 746.  For claims of post-acquisition discrimination, Cox expressly did “not 
foreclose the possibility of a section 3604(a) or (b) claim as the result of eviction or 
constructive eviction, because such actions may make housing ‘unavailable’ or deny 
‘privileges of sale’ or ‘services.’”  Id. at 745 n.32. 
15 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
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victimized them with slurs; vandalized their property (among other 
things, by applying chemicals to their yard that were harmful to their 
health and well-being); restricted the use of their property; and then 
destroyed evidence to hide the harassment.16  On appeal, the issue was 
whether these facts, accepted as true, stated a case for Title VIII 
discrimination.17  After a relatively cursory review of the statute—
which did not differentiate between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of 
section 3604—the court ruled against the plaintiffs by reasoning that 
they were “complaining not about being prevented from acquiring 
property but about being harassed by other property owners.”18 
Inequality, however, does not have an expiration date.  It can 
manifest in a myriad of subtle forms, including through people’s 
relationship with their homes.  Accordingly, neither case addressed 
the argument that section 3604(b) covers post-acquisition 
discrimination in specific services expected from the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, and many other courts have 
expressly adopted a broader interpretation.19  The most logical 
reading of the plain language of section 3604—and the structural 
division between subparagraphs (a) and (b)—must be that 
subparagraph (a) generally refers to discriminatory conduct that 
would make housing separate and that subparagraph (b) generally 
refers to such conduct that would make the nature of housing unequal 
in terms of the basic expectations that residents may have about the 
safety and sanctity of their home at the time of the transaction (such 
as those expectations from a landlord, housing association, or 
municipality).20  Specifically, section 3604(a) covers conduct that 
makes housing otherwise unavailable,21 which has been interpreted to 
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 328. 
18 Id. at 328–29. 
19 See, e.g., ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 
§ 4:4 (2008); Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of 
Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 n.45 (2008) 
(listing cases); Rajotte, supra note 2, at 66 n.95 (discussing cases); Aric Short, Post-
Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 215 
n.89 (2006) (discussing cases). 
20 For example, a new African-American resident to a predominantly white enclave 
should have a section 3604(b) claim for the refusal to provide him or her with water 
services, just as the current residents of a predominantly African-American enclave should 
have the same claim for denial of the same service. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006). 
 2009] A Housing-Centered Approach to Justice 169 
cover virtually any conduct affecting availability.22  A section 3604(b) 
claim, however, requires discrimination with respect to “services” or 
“privileges,” inherently suggesting a nexus to discriminatory conduct 
that impairs the nature of housing, no matter how severe the harm, 
which can happen at any time. 
A relatively early case from the District of Columbia Circuit Court, 
Clifton Terrace Associates v. United Technologies Corp., offered a 
similar reading in stating that section 3604(b) addresses habitability.23  
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit had previously recognized in Southend 
Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair that section 
3604 generally “forbids discrimination in making available or 
providing services related to housing.”24  Also, consider a case from 
almost thirty years ago where a district court within the Seventh 
Circuit applied section 3604(b) post-acquisitionally and emphatically 
rejected the defendants’ argument against it. 
 Such a tortured interpretation of the application of § 3604(b) is 
ludicrous and runs counter to the plain and unequivocal language of 
the statute.  Quite clearly, the plaintiffs have alleged that they are 
not getting the kinds of services and facilities that were available to 
tenants when the project was predominantly white, and that this 
differential treatment existed because they are black. . . .  This court 
can but note that there need be no argument when the statutory 
language is so clear.25 
It seems clear that the Halprin and Cox courts were concerned 
about transforming the Fair Housing Act into a common law nuisance 
action.  The concern about creating this kind of slippery slope is 
 
22 See, e.g., Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass’n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 
1987) (“[A]lthough section 3604(a) applies principally to the sale or rental of dwellings, it 
also encompasses a wide variety of discriminatory practices that affect detrimentally the 
availability of housing to minorities and thereby make housing more difficult to obtain.”); 
United States v. Hous. Auth., 504 F. Supp. 716, 726 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (“Section [3604(a)] 
forbids not only the refusal to sell or rent a dwelling, but also prohibits all practices that 
‘otherwise make unavailable or deny’ housing to any person because of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin.  This provision is as broad as Congress could have made it 
and it reaches every private and public practice that makes housing more difficult to obtain 
on prohibited grounds.”). 
23 Clifton Terrace Assocs. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 719–20 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
24 Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 
1209 (7th Cir. 1984).  Cox also cited this case approvingly in analyzing section 3604(a).  
Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 2005). 
25 Concerned Tenants Ass’n v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. 
Ill. 1980). 
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certainly legitimate.  But Halprin suggests far too narrow a view of 
the statute and its purpose while Cox lacks normative clarity.  The 
Fifth Circuit in Cox stated that the issue hinged on whether the 
conduct was “connected” to the “sale or rental” of housing, but it did 
not specify what these terms meant.26  At the same time, the court 
found it conceivable to connect important municipal services in this 
way.27  The holding reflects generalized policy considerations and a 
conclusory restatement of the “connected” legal standard without 
applying it.28  More importantly for social and environmental justice, 
Cox’s implicit application of what that term is not comes at the 
expense of sanctioning conduct that would clearly and directly harm 
residents’ health and welfare in their homes and neighborhood by a 
municipality charged with protecting those interests.  Equally 
problematic, it did so by denying a prima facie claim under the Fair 
Housing Act in the first instance.  Arguments along these lines have 
been developed elsewhere.29  How section 3604(b) applies here, 
however, is worth exploring. 
First, my central thesis explains why section 3604(b) should have a 
different application in the reconstruction.  Specifically, I previously 
analyzed how this statute may apply to challenges in how the 
government is (or is not) remediating soil contamination.30  The 
impetus for my focus on section 3604(b), and its interplay with 
section 3617 (a separate provision discussed below), was that Cox and 
Halprin should be considered inapposite to soil remediation during 
the reconstruction.  This approach analyzes a relatively intricate 
system of Title VIII case law, but its core is uncomplicated: the 
reconstruction, if done justly, should go hand in hand with new and 
safe housing opportunities post-Katrina.31  Indeed, Cox analogously 
recognized that “[t]o the extent that some courts hold that general 
police and fire protection are within the scope of § 3604(b), . . . one 
can still conceivably connect [these services] to the ‘sale or rental of a 
dwelling.’”32 
 
26 See Cox, 430 F.3d at 746–47. 
27 See id. at 745 n.36. 
28 Id. at 745–47. 
29 See SCHWEMM, supra note 19, at § 14:3; Oliveri, supra note 19, at 9 n.45; Short, 
supra note 19, at 215 n.89. 
30 See Rajotte, supra note 2, at 54–60 (discussing state cleanup thresholds with respect 
to soil contamination). 
31 See id. at 53. 
32 Cox, 430 F.3d at 745 n.36. 
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Here, any disparate impacts would be linked in time and go hand in 
hand with new housing opportunities in the reconstruction.  The 
devastation is difficult to imagine, let alone to have experienced as a 
resident.  Many thousands of homes, both owner-occupied and rental, 
were either destroyed or significantly flood damaged.33  Communities 
were displaced.  Lives were lost.  As of the writing of this Article, 
spray paint on many homes still bears witness to the incompressible 
depth of what happened.  The rebuilding process cannot be said to 
involve the traditional sort of challenges to the post-acquisition siting 
or operation of locally undesirable land uses.  Housing has not simply 
been acquired—it has been lost.  And the reconstruction, “which 
necessarily contemplates (if not directly provides for) the sale, resale, 
and releasing of housing, ought to carry with it a duty not to vest new 
generations in these communities with preventable contamination” 
and other such harms.34  Housing and the reconstruction are 
interdependent, both temporally and substantively. 
Second, cases have also held that section 3604(b) applies post-
acquisitionally against certain defendants, such as landlords and 
building service providers, because of the special nature of their 
relationship.  This both supports my original approach and provides 
an independent basis for a section 3604(b) claim by existing residents 
in the special context of the rebuilding process.  Often cited among 
these cases is Richards v. Bono, which held that the narrow 
interpretation as expressed by Halprin does not “extend to cases of 
post-acquisition discrimination in a rental context.”35  One, but not the 
only, basis for the distinction is that a rental suggests a continuing 
relationship.36  However, even cases following Halprin have 
distinguished its rigid approach in light of the overall nature of the 
relationship between the parties and the victim’s expectations in that 
relationship.  One district court within the Seventh Circuit (and 
thereby bound to follow Halprin as precedent) would have allowed a 
 
33 See, e.g., William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity: Housing that Working and 
Poor People Can Afford in New Orleans Since Katrina, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 
394–95 & nn.5–6 (2007); Rajotte, supra note 2, at 67 & n.107. 
34 Rajotte, supra note 2, at 73. 
35 Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 
2005). 
36 See id. (“Unlike a sale, a rental arrangement involves an ongoing relationship 
between the landlord and tenant in which the landlord typically retains various powers, 
such as the right to increase rent or evict a tenant, and concomitant obligations, such as the 
duty to make repairs or provide other services and facilities.”). 
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tenant’s claim to proceed based on a discriminatory refusal to provide 
maintenance services had the tenants been able to make out a prima 
facie case.37  The Court reasoned that because “Halprin addressed 
general ‘interference with enjoyment’ rather than denial of specific 
services, . . . the Court [would] not presume that the Seventh Circuit 
intended to categorically preclude all denial of service claims under § 
3604(b).”38  Furthermore, a district court in Florida upheld a post-
acquisitional section 3604(b) claim by a homeowner in a planned 
community based precisely on the victim’s expectation of specific 
services that are “part and parcel with home ownership,” stating: 
Ordinarily, a homeowner purchases a home for the home itself.  
After the sale, provision or lack of provision of services for that 
homeowner might decrease his enjoyment of his home, but absent 
some interference with his ability to inhabit it, the Halprin line of 
cases have found [Title VIII] to be inapplicable.  Halprin, and other 
similar cases, however, did not directly address the provision of 
services as they relate to planned communities where some types of 
services are in fact part and parcel with home ownership. 
 . . . . 
 Accordingly, part and parcel of the purchase of a home within a 
planned community are the rights and privileges associated with 
membership within the community.  It would appear, therefore, that 
in the context of planned communities, where association members 
have rights to use designated common areas as an incident of their 
ownership, discriminatory conduct which deprives them of 
exercising those rights would be actionable under [Title VIII].39 
Cox precluded this application and also recognized that it is 
conceivable to connect important municipal services to the sale or 
rental of housing without limiting the definition of “connect” in this 
 
37 Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments L.P., No. 05-C-0348, 2006 WL 1519320, at 
*5–6 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2006). 
38 Id. at *6.  The plaintiffs “provided specific facts as to the number of days the repairs 
required and their repeated calls and written requests for repair,” but the court rejected 
their claims in finding no disparate impact.  Id. at *7; see also United States v. Koch, 352 
F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (D. Neb. 2004) (“It seems to me that little progress could have been 
made toward Congress’s goals—and its measures would appear to have few teeth—if the 
basic privilege of residing within one’s home were not protected from the evils of 
discriminatory harassment.”); Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 
C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (2008) (“Prohibited actions under this section include, but are not 
limited to . . . [f]ailing or delaying maintenance or repairs of sale or rental dwellings.”).  
For these reasons, Rigel Oliveri argues that the issue should turn on whether the defendant 
exercises control over the plaintiff’s housing situation.  Oliveri, supra note 19, at 3, 46–50. 
39 Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners’ Ass’n, 456 F. 
Supp. 2d 1223, 1229–30 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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context.40  Here, the government plays an integral role in facilitating 
safe homes and communities post-Katrina.  Unlike anywhere else, 
residents have a special dependency on the government to carry out 
specific services in fulfilling its public trust duty.41 
Third, section 3617 makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, 
threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, 
or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, . . . any right 
granted or protected by” enumerated sections of the Fair Housing Act, 
section 3604 being among them.42  The Fifth Circuit, in an 
unpublished opinion, decided against an existing homeowner on facts 
that appear less compelling than in Cox.43  Without elaboration, it 
cited Cox and Halprin for the proposition that section 3604 prohibits 
conduct that goes to the “availability” of housing but not its 
“habitability.”44  Cox did not involve section 3617, and its holding 
under section 3604(b) did not concern availability.45  This case and a 
handful of other cases with similarly generalized language manifest 
an imprecise form of judicial shorthand that does not distinguish 
between subparagraphs (a) and (b) in disposing of post-acquisitional 
claims46 and are inapposite to this analysis for the reasons discussed 
above. 
As Robert Schwemm describes it, section 3617 is a watchdog for 
those who are blocked from asserting or exercising their fair housing 
rights, such as through interference or retaliation by third parties.47  
 
40 Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746–47 & n.36 (5th Cir. 2005). 
41 The government likewise maintains the same degree of control and the same integral 
role over residents and their homes irrespective of what kind of estate they hold—for 
example, whether through ownership or rental.  Indeed, it can perhaps be said that the 
obligation should run even stronger to homeowners because they have more at stake. 
42 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). 
43 Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 
2669480, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (discussing the case’s facts), aff’d per curiam, 
235 F. App’x 227 (5th Cir. 2007). 
44 Reule, 235 F. App’x at 227. 
45 Cox, 430 F.3d at 746. 
46 See, e.g., Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that Halprin 
stands for the proposition that section 3604(b) “does not address discrimination after 
ownership has changed hands”); Reule, 235 F. App’x at 227–28. 
47 SCHWEMM, supra note 19, at § 20:2 (“For example, if a black family who has just 
moved to a white neighborhood is threatened or intimidated by a white neighbor, the 
neighbor’s conduct would violate § 3617’s second phrase (‘on account of [the family’s] 
having exercised’ their rights), but that conduct might not violate § 3604(a) unless it 
caused the family to move and thereby made housing ‘unavailable’ to them.”); see also 
Oliveri, supra note 19, at 11–12 (providing a hypothetical showing section 3617 violations  
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This is consistent with the statute’s plain language, which speaks to 
rights without regard to whether they are violated.  It also bears 
mentioning that “discriminatory housing practice” is by definition an 
unlawful act under sections 3604, 3605, 3606, and 3617.48  Inversely, 
the district court in United States v. Koch interpreted section 3617 as 
meaning interference with use or enjoyment of housing after 
acquisition.49  The applicable Department of Housing and Urban 
Development regulation also covers interference with “enjoyment of a 
dwelling.”50  The Halprin court suggested in dictum that this 
regulation was an illegitimate exercise of agency authority but 
allowed the claim to proceed because the defendants had not 
challenged the regulation’s validity.51  The court in Koch, by contrast, 
rejected Halprin’s dictum and employed the Supreme Court’s well-
known “Chevron test” to uphold the regulation as a reasonable 
interpretation of section 3617.52 
In accordance with the application discussed above and the 
principle of framing complaints broadly, a section 3617 claim may be 
based on the government’s interference with plaintiffs’ ability to 
effectuate new safe housing opportunities, undermining Title VIII’s 
purpose and effect.53  While this suggests a more penumbral legal 
 
from (1) a landlord’s eviction of a tenant because she filed a HUD complaint against him 
for sexual harassment; (2) regardless of the eviction, the landlord’s interference with the 
tenant’s ability to seek, obtain, or reside in housing free of discrimination; and (3) a 
landlord’s harassment of a third party for assisting the tenant in exercising her rights); 
Short, supra note 19, at 217–19 (discussing the reasons supporting section 3617’s 
application to post-acquisition conduct). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (2006). 
49 United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978–79 (D. Neb. 2004) (pinpointing the 
statute’s language of interference with a person “on account of his having exercised or 
enjoyed” a section 3604 right); see also United States v. Veal, No. 02-0720-CV-W-DW, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10875, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 12, 2005) (finding Koch 
“extremely persuasive”). 
50 Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) 
(2008); see also id. § 100.70(d)(4) (“Prohibited activities relating to dwellings . . . include, 
but are not limited to . . . [r]efusing to provide municipal services . . . for dwellings or 
providing such services . . . differently.”). 
51 Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 
(7th Cir. 2004) (dictum). 
52 Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 979–80 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
53 See, e.g., Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661, 662, 663 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“[Defendant] erected a metal gate across the road and placed a lock upon the gate, thereby 
preventing [the plaintiff] from reaching and using her property . . . .  On account of 
[plaintiff’s] race, defendant has threatened, intimidated, and harassed her . . . .  [This]  
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standard, even a de minimis government interference has been found 
actionable (a fact which goes to the remedy and not liability itself).  
As one district court held: 
Neither the cases nor the legislative history of § 3617 attempt to 
define the minimum level of intimidation or coercion necessary to 
violate this statute.  Therefore, the Court assumes that the words of 
the statute—“coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere”—mean 
exactly what they say.  The fact that the City’s behavior is not as 
severe or egregious as some other cases under § 3617 does not 
mean that, as a matter of law, what the City did was not violative of 
this provision.  Moreover, if the trier of fact considers that the acts 
of the City constituted slight or de minimis interference, such a 
conclusion can be adequately reflected in an appropriate award of 
damages.54 
Additionally, the Northern District of Texas’ decision in Lopez v. 
City of Dallas is instructive.55  As referenced above, section 3604(a) 
makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a 
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person” based 
on race.56  In Lopez, the plaintiffs alleged that the city discriminatorily 
“limited its provision of protection from adverse industrial uses and 
flooding, and its provision of adequate water drainage,” making 
housing “unavailable to future residents of Cadillac Heights because 
of their race.”57  The court allowed the plaintiffs to go forward with 
 
conduct is arguably within the prohibitions of both §§ 3604(a) and 3617.”); Groome Res., 
Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 52 F. Supp. 2d 721, 724–25 (E.D. La. 1999) (enjoining a 
zoning ordinance on the ground that it violated section 3617 by “unnecessarily restricting 
[the plaintiffs’] ability to live in residences of their choice”); Summerchase Ltd. v. City of 
Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522, 531–32, 540 (M.D. La. 1997) (finding genuine issues of 
material fact as to whether two defendants violated section 3617 based on allegations that 
they hindered construction of low-income housing). 
54 People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 733 n.5 (E.D. Va. 
1992). 
55 Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2006 WL 1450520 (N.D. Tex. May 
24, 2006). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).  Compare Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 744 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (rejecting the argument that section 3604(a) applied because the record did not 
show that the residentially zoned portions of the landfill site met Title VIII’s definition of 
a dwelling), with Lopez, 2006 WL 1450520, at *2, *8 (allowing a section 3604(a) claim, 
alleging that “discrimination in municipal services has rendered dwelling units unavailable 
to future residents,” where the neighborhood was in the flood plain but the city “refused to 
provide flood protection”). 
57 Lopez, 2006 WL 1450520, at *4–5. 
[N]inety-six parcels of land currently zoned for single family residential use are in 
the 100-year flood plain, and the entire Cadillac Heights neighborhood is in the  
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their claim that the city “violated § 3604(a) by making other plots of 
land in the Cadillac Heights neighborhood unavailable to third 
persons on the basis of race.”58  Michael Daniel, counsel for plaintiffs 
in Lopez and Cox, has pointed out that unequal services here may 
make it more difficult to place housing back on the land, secure 
financing, sell or lease such housing that is put back on the land, 
rebuild communities, and so forth, which are prerequisites for a claim 
by current or prospective residents based on unavailability. 
II 
POST-KATRINA APPLICATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
Focusing on soil remediation, the reconstruction ignited fresh 
debate over lead, arsenic, and other contaminants.  Indeed, lead was a 
focal point of a joint workshop held at the Deep South Center for 
Environmental Justice’s Race, Place, and the Environment After 
Katrina symposium in New Orleans on May 15, 2008.59  This 
emanates from studies to test the extent of contamination post-
Katrina—including lead, arsenic, and contaminants from landfills, 
which were found in some cases in excess of state cleanup 
thresholds60—combined with the recognition that any such risks 
should be addressed now regardless of their cause.61 
 
800-year flood plain.  The City prohibits construction of dwelling units in a flood 
plain and, therefore, many parcels of land which would otherwise be ‘available’ are 
rendered unavailable to potential future residents. 
Id. at *5 (citation omitted). 
58 Id. at *4; see also Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 2004 WL 2026804, 
at *3–6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004) (upholding part of plaintiffs’ section 3604(a) claim in a 
previous opinion). 
59 See Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Race, Place, and the Environment 
After Katrina, http://www.dscej.org/PlenNWorkshop.html (last visited May 5, 2009). 
60 See Rajotte, supra note 2, at 55–56 & nn.23–26, 57–58 & nn.33–46 (citing studies); 
William Kern et al., Soil Toxicity in Post-Katrina New Orleans, Presentation at the Deep 
South Center for Environmental Justice Symposium (May 15, 2008) (presentation on 
samples tested for lead and arsenic), available at http://www.dscej 
.org/PlenNWorkshop.html (follow “Soil Contamination in Post-Katrina New Orleans” 
hyperlink); Howard W. Mielke, Race, Place and Lead in New Orleans, Presentation at the 
Deep South Center for Environmental Justice Symposium (May 15, 2008) (presentation on 
samples tested for lead), available at http://www.dscej.org/PlenNWorkshop.html (follow 
“Lead in Urban Environment” hyperlink). 
61 See, e.g., MORSE, supra note 4, at 10–15; Robert D. Bullard, Let Them Eat Dirt: Will 
the “Mother of All Toxic Cleanups” Be Fair to All NOLA Neighborhoods, Even When 
Some Contamination Predates Katrina? 4 (Apr. 14, 2006) (unpublished article), available 
at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/Let_Them_Eat_Dirt.pdf. 
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Some of the most extensive data and analyses concern lead in soil.  
While childhood lead exposure is not isolated to New Orleans, the 
issue has taken on a new force in the reconstruction for these reasons.  
Howard Mielke writes how soil-lead contamination is most pervasive 
in urban centers in New Orleans and other major cites and affects 
home safety (especially for young children) given its relationship to 
blood-lead levels.62  Other post-Katrina studies have found elevated 
levels of both lead and arsenic in schoolyards.63  Also, as William 
Kern pointed out in his presentation about arsenic testing at this joint 
workshop, even insofar as such contamination may not itself evidence 
a disparate impact, the issue of where, when, and how any 
remediation is carried out may do so.  The same can be said for other 
material aspects of the reconstruction. 
After an ecological disaster such as this, “[w]hile the numbers of 
dead, injured, or hospitalized can be counted, the psychological and 
social sequelae are harder to quantify—there is no universal unit for 
indicating the amount of anxiety, depression, social disruption, or 
family hardship that these events produce.”64  As Aric Short 
described, these hardships are compounded by environmental 
injustices, precisely because the idea of “home” itself “provides 
intensely personal benefits to its inhabitants, including rootedness, 
privacy, and safety” against discrimination and hostile surroundings.65  
This is consistent with the axiom that real property is so unique that 
related losses cannot be adequately remedied with money damages,66 
 
62 See Howard W. Mielke, Soil Is an Important Pathway of Human Lead Exposure, 106 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPPLEMENTS 217 (1998), available at http://www.ehponline 
.org/members/1998/Suppl-1/217-229mielke/full.html; Rajotte, supra note 2, at 56–57 & 
nn.28–38, 75–76 & nn.161–64 (citing studies on lead contamination and sources 
discussing related harms); Mielke, supra note 60. 
63 See LESLIE FIELDS ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, KATRINA’S WAKE (2007), 
available at http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/wake/wake.pdf; Rajotte, supra note 2, at 
54–55 n.18 (citing and cross-referencing studies); Kern et al., supra note 60. 
64 Julie G. Cwikel et al., Understanding the Psychological and Societal Response of 
Individuals, Groups, Authorities, and Media to Toxic Hazards, in TOXIC TURMOIL 39, 40 
(Johan M. Havenaar et al. eds., 2002). 
65 Short, supra note 19, at 254. 
66 See, e.g., United States v. Esposito, 970 F.2d 1156, 1160 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(acknowledging that real property and the “relationship between a person and his or her 
home are unique”); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 734 F.2d 774, 788 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(“Possibly wrongful eviction from one’s home is a serious injury.  It is well recognized 
that real property is unique and not fungible.  A person’s home has even more intangible 
value.”); Hillard v. Franklin, 41 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“Given that real 
property is unique, damages are generally deemed an inadequate remedy for breach of real  
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and the central tenant of constitutional law that home is the “center of 
the private lives of our people.”67  Residents have already faced 
inestimable harm in its aftermath and will no doubt encounter more if 
the reconstruction perpetuates a new cycle of injustice.  “This 
opportunity for action is unique, both temporally and because the 
costs can be contained.  To the contrary, the cost of doing nothing is 
greater and more widespread, perhaps inestimable.”68 
Housing is at the center of social and environmental justice.  
Injustices were not only exposed by Hurricane Katrina but 
exacerbated by it and may continue to persist without intervention.  
For instance, as the Lower Ninth Ward Planning District Rebuilding 
Plan states: “The Lower Ninth Ward Neighborhood has a long history 
of neglect by the City, State and the Federal government.  From the 
minimal construction of basic infrastructure to the limited assistance 
offered in the wake of Hurricane Betsey, this neighborhood has 
frequently not received its fair share.”69  This neighborhood suffered 
unparalleled damage relative to other New Orleans neighborhoods.70  
The government’s collapse in the hours and, tragically, even several 
days after the levees failed and the problematic system of flood 
protection and eroding coastline that endure cannot be detached from 
this picture.  Litigation, combined with activism and coalitions 
focused on advancing community interests, may play a correlative 
role by rebalancing power asymmetries and petitioning an 
independent judiciary for relief.  Narrowing Title VIII here may 
effectively sanction discriminatory conduct in carrying out the 
rebuilding process, re-creating the conditions that it was designed to 
 
estate contracts, and, accordingly, such contracts are generally eligible for specific 
performance.”). 
67 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 (2006) (“We have, after all, lived our whole 
national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient adage that a man’s house is his 
castle [to the point that t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of 
the Crown.’” (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
68 Rajotte, supra note 2, at 77. 
69 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, LOWER NINTH WARD PLANNING DISTRICT REBUILDING 
PLAN 14 (2006), available at http://nolanrp.com/Data/Neighborhood/District_8_Final 
_Lower%20Ninth%20Ward.pdf. 
70 Id. at 9; see also Lisa K. Bates, Housing Recovery of Ninth Ward: Disparities in 
Policy and Prospects, Presentation at the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice 
Symposium (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.dscej.org/PlenNWorkshop.html 
(follow “Housing Recovery of Ninth Ward: Disparities in Policy and Prospects” 
hyperlink). 
 2009] A Housing-Centered Approach to Justice 179 
eliminate.  Whatever comes to pass, in Oliver Houck’s words, “will 
change South Louisiana entirely.” 71 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Forty years since Title VIII’s enactment, barriers to fair housing 
persist in terms of power asymmetries, procedural defects and 
nontransparency, inequitable distributions of benefits and burdens to 
individuals and communities, and subtle yet institutionalized forms of 
discrimination.  Not all Title VIII claims have succeeded, but this has 
not interfered with its disparate-impact and segregative-effect burdens 
of proof, and it cannot disturb the private right of action that the law 
guarantees.  Rather, a principal Title VIII issue now surrounds how to 
construe section 3604(b)’s “in connection therewith” element.  I argue 
that a narrow interpretation is distinguishable, both factually and 
legally, given how extensive and inextricably linked housing is with 
everything that must come post-Katrina.  This moment in the history 
of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast cannot be replicated.  It would be 
worthwhile to reexamine what we mean by housing rights, and their 
unmistakable intersection with social and environmental justice, with 
the same promise that comes with revitalizing a great city. 
 
 
71 Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 41 (2006). 
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